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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 With a few exceptions, the Office of the Solicitor General controls 
all aspects of federal agency litigation before the U.S. Supreme 
Court, bearing a significant influence on the high court’s legal deci-
sions. 1 For example, in recent high-profile administrative law cases 
involving the federal government’s regulation of tobacco cigarettes2 
and ozone,3 the Solicitor General requested that the Supreme Court 
grant certiorari to review government losses below and possibly re-
verse opinions by lower courts. By making such requests, the Solici-
tor General made it highly probable that the Supreme Court would 
hear each case.4 Once the Court granted certiorari, the probability of 
a government victory in each case was also high.5 
 Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer’s study, The Government Liti-
gant Advantage,6 sheds important light on how the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s litigation behavior may impact the Supreme Court’s decision-
making agenda and outcomes for regulatory and administrative law 
cases. By emphasizing how the Solicitor General affects cases that 
the Supreme Court decides, Cohen and Spitzer’s findings confirm 
                                                                                                                  
 * Patricia A. Dore Associate Professor of State Administrative Procedure, Florida 
State University College of Law; Visiting Associate Professor, University of Texas School of 
Law, 2000-2001; LL.M., Yale Law School, 1994; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 
1991; B.S., Arizona State University, Tempe, 1988. 
 1. See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over 
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 311 (1994) (“The Solicitor General 
wins roughly three fourths of his cases because of his care in selecting cases, his experience 
in presenting them, and his reputation before the Supreme Court.”). 
 2. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). 
 3. See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 121 S. Ct. 903, 911-14 (2001), rev’ing 
in part American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 4. See Devins, supra note 1, at 318. Devins notes that the Solicitor General seeks 
certiorari in only 5-15% of the cases when desired by federal agencies. According to Devins, 
the Court has shown some deference to the Solicitor General’s function as a “gatekeeper,” 
granting certiorari to 70% of requests by government litigants. 
 5. See id. at 311. 
 6. Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: 
Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 391 (2000). 
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that administrative law’s emphasis on lower appellate court deci-
sions is not misplaced. Some say that D.C. Circuit cases carry 
equal—if not more—precedential weight than Supreme Court deci-
sions in resolving administrative law issues. Cohen and Spitzer use 
positive political theory to provide a novel explanation for some of 
this bias towards circuit court decisions in defining the rule of law in 
administrative law practice and scholarship. 
 What Cohen and Spitzer’s finding of “government litigant advan-
tage” means more generally for the rule of law in the regulatory con-
text requires further elaboration. Their data suggest that the gov-
ernment is significantly more successful as a petitioner before the 
Supreme Court, even taking into account that petitioners are more 
likely than not to be successful once certiorari has been granted, and 
that the Supreme Court favors the government’s position more than 
do circuit courts. Cohen and Spitzer’s findings should not come as a 
surprise given the Solicitor General’s participation as a repeat player 
in Supreme Court litigation. Although their study raises questions 
regarding the desirability of the government litigant advantage, they 
do not explain why the government’s high degree of success as a liti-
gant before the U.S. Supreme Court thwarts the rule of law in a con-
stitutional democracy. Indeed, the government’s success as a litigant 
may have virtues for our constitutional democracy, which recognizes 
a unitary or strong executive. 
II.   THE PROMINENCE OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 Government reformers often decry an “unequal playing field” in 
the litigation arena as a reason for tilting the rule of law in the regu-
latory context to be more favorable for private litigants. Cohen and 
Spitzer caution that, to the extent reformers focus their criticism on 
a limited sample of Supreme Court cases, reformers may be watching 
the wrong game. Since, by their sheer number, circuit court decisions 
sometimes speak with equal, if not more, finality than Supreme 
Court decisions, passing judgment on the rule of law based solely on 
the outcome of Supreme Court decisions may overinflate any gov-
ernment advantage in administrative procedure. 
 In administrative law corners, some say that D.C. Circuit cases 
carry equal—if not more—precedential weight than Supreme Court 
decisions. Judge Henry Friendly once observed that the D.C. Circuit 
“savored its role” as a specialized administrative law court because of 
its exclusive jurisdiction over decisions on Federal Communications 
Commission licensing and decisions as to emission standards under 
the Clean Air Act7 by the Environmental Protection Agency, as well 
                                                                                                                  
 7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994). 
2000]                         SOLICITOR GENERAL ADVANTAGE 461 
 
as an optional venue under many regulatory statutes.8 Richard 
Pierce speculates that “the D.C. Circuit is second only to the U.S. 
Supreme Court with respect to the volume of critical writing its opin-
ions elicit.”9 One recent author concludes that the D.C. Circuit is rec-
ognized among practitioners as a “de facto, quasi-specialized admin-
istrative law court of last resort.”10 Cohen and Spitzer use rational 
choice theory to provide a novel explanation for some of this bias to-
wards circuit court decisions, and away from the Supreme Court de-
cisions, in defining the rule of law for the regulatory state. 
 In explaining this finding, Cohen and Spitzer reaffirm what most 
practicing administrative lawyers already know; the D.C. Circuit, to 
a greater extent than the Supreme Court, makes the relevant body of 
law for administrative practice. The implications of Cohen and Spit-
zer’s findings impact administrative law scholarship as well. If schol-
ars focus exclusively on Supreme Court decisions, they are likely to 
miss certain trends in administrative law. For example, as Peter 
Schuck and Donald Elliot have found, lower courts, including the 
D.C. Circuit, seem to give more credence to the Chevron doctrine11 
than the Supreme Court.12 Cohen and Spitzer’s findings give a novel 
and plausible explanation as to why focus on the D.C. Circuit and 
other circuit courts is not misguided. 
 Cohen and Spitzer’s study also seems to bolster approaches to 
scholarship that move away from judicial decisions and towards bu-
reaucracy and more “informal” legal sources. Private party appeals of 
agency action—whether real or perceived threats to the agency—may 
have some effect on the agency decisionmaking process prior to ap-
peal. Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst, for instance, chronicle how 
the threat of litigation affected the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration decisionmaking process. 13 Since informal mecha-
                                                                                                                  
 8. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1310-11 
(1975).  
 9. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Relationship Between the District of Columbia Circuit 
and Its Critics, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 797, 797 (1999). 
 10. CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT at xiii 
(1999). 
 11.  See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 
(1984). The Court stated: 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 
Id. 
 12. Compare Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE 
L.J. 969, 984 (1992) (finding Chevron has little discernable influence on the Supreme 
Court’s decisions), with Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An 
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1061 (finding lower 
court deference to agency interpretations increased significantly following Chevron). 
 13. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 200-
01 (1990). 
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nisms may affect the administrative process outside of appellate liti-
gation, focusing on appellate litigation as the sole source for the rule 
of law may exaggerate the overall statist bias of judges’ preferences 
or of legal doctrine. 
III.   THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS TENTH JUSTICE? 
 Using principal-agent rational choice methods, Cohen and Spitzer 
model the Solicitor General as an agent of the executive branch. They 
distinguish between cases where the government has been involved 
as a party in litigation below and cases where the government files 
as amicus. In the former set of cases, the federal government may 
have strong institutional concerns. In the latter set of cases, the So-
licitor General is more likely to participate because of the Admini-
stration’s views on controversial issues, such as the constitutionality 
of state abortion laws, over which the federal government may have 
no direct institutional involvement.14 In both contexts, Cohen and 
Spitzer find a government litigant advantage, although the former is 
more substantial than the latter. 
 Apart from this distinction, however, Cohen and Spitzer do not 
model all of the complexities of the Solicitor General’s role in the 
practice of government litigation. Some have described the Solicitor 
General as a “Tenth Justice” of sorts, serving dual loyalties to both 
the executive and judicial branches.15 Francis Biddle, who served as 
Solicitor General during 1940-41 under President Roosevelt, wrote 
that the Solicitor General “is responsible neither to the man who ap-
pointed him [the President] nor to his immediate superior in the hi-
erarchy of administration [the Attorney General].”16 Instead, Biddle 
suggested that although the Solicitor General represents the execu-
tive branch, “his guide is only the ethic of his own profession framed 
in the ambience of his experience and judgment.”17 
 Two aspects of the Solicitor General’s role lend credibility to the 
account of the Solicitor General as a Tenth Justice. First, the Solici-
tor General does not pursue every case that executive agencies wish 
to appeal.18 The Solicitor General rejects five requests for appeal from 
                                                                                                                  
 14. For further focus on the distinction between the Solicitor General’s roles in these 
two types of cases, see  David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the 
United States, L. & CONTEMP. PROB., Winter 1998, at 165, 166-67 (1998) (distinguishing 
between “institutional” and “Administration” based views of the Solicitor General’s inter-
ests). 
 15. E.g., LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 3 (1987). 
 16. FRANCIS BIDDLE , IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 97 (1962). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Devins, supra note 1, at 318.  
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federal agencies for every one he sends to the Supreme Court.19 In 
deciding which appeals to pursue, the Solicitor General may consider 
the executive branch’s political agenda, but he probably also weighs 
the importance and merits of the legal arguments, the limited re-
sources of the government, and the crowded dockets of the courts. 20 
 Second, as Cohen and Spitzer’s findings seem to confirm, Justices 
on the Court give extra credibility to the role performed—and the 
views expressed—by the Solicitor General. Filing between seventy 
and eighty petitions for certiorari and jurisdictional statements and 
participating in oral arguments in most of the cases involving the 
federal government, the Solicitor General amasses considerable ap-
pellate experience before the Supreme Court. With this experience, 
the Solicitor General’s office has the opportunity, foreclosed to pri-
vate litigants, to build reputation and credibility with the Court.21 
Due in part to familiarity, the Solicitor General also has a tradition 
of relationships with the Justices and their clerks. 22 Thus, although 
he clearly operates within the executive branch, the Solicitor General 
may have dual loyalties, suggesting that a principal-agent model lim-
ited exclusively to the executive branch is overly simple. 
IV.   WHAT DOES A GOVERNMENT LITIGANT ADVANTAGE MEAN FOR 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE? 
 Despite this alternative conception of the Solicitor General’s role, 
Cohen and Spitzer model the Solicitor General as an agent of the ex-
ecutive branch. Their approach makes sense. Cohen and Spitzer’s 
model may fail to describe some of the filtering and influence of the 
Solicitor General, but their model does allow the simplification nec-
essary to empirically model the complex phenomena of government 
litigation and their effect on outcomes, such as the Court’s decision to 
grant certiorari. The Solicitor General, as a member of the executive 
branch, is appointed by the President. Although he may hold special 
                                                                                                                  
 19. See Rex E. Lee, The Office of Solicitor General: Political Appointee, Advocate, and 
Officer of the Court, in AN ESSENTIAL SAFEGUARD: ESSAYS ON THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 51, 60 (D. Grier Stephenson Jr., ed. 1991) (“[F]or every 
time the Solicitor General accedes to a request to seek Supreme Court review, he says no 
about five times.”). 
 20. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161 (1984). The Court stated: 
It would be idle to pretend that the conduct of government litigation in all its 
myriad features, from the decision to file a complaint in the United States Dis-
trict Court to the decision to petition for certiorari to review a judgment of the 
Court of Appeals, is a wholly mechanical procedure which involves no policy 
choices whatever. 
Id. 
 21. See Devins, supra note 1, at 311.  
 22. See CAPLAN, supra note 15, at 255-67 (discussing the erosion of trust between the 
Justices’ clerks and the Solicitor General’s office during Charles Fried’s term under Presi-
dent Reagan). 
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persuasive authority with the Court, the Solicitor General does not 
vote on cases. The effect Cohen and Spitzer attempt to measure is 
associated with the Solicitor General’s role as a litigator, so a princi-
pal-agent understanding allows comparison of the success rates be-
tween government and private litigators. 23  
 At the same time, Cohen and Spitzer characterize the govern-
ment’s win record as “abnormally successful,” raising the issue of 
whether a government litigant advantage is desirable.24 Clearly, 
their study does not purport to supply a normative analysis of 
whether government litigant advantage thwarts the rule of law in a 
constitutional democracy. But such a normative explanation is nec-
essary to draw recommendations from their analysis. 
 On the one hand, to the extent the Solicitor General is able to tilt 
the playing field against private litigants, the government litigant 
advantage may raise legitimate concerns. If the government is more 
able than private litigants to influence the Supreme Court and win 
cases, such influence may affect the perceived legitimacy of the rule 
of law and the judicial process that helps to define it, leading to a loss 
of public confidence in the judiciary. A government litigant advan-
tage could also feed reformist impulses by contributing to public 
skepticism about the influence of the President and the independence 
of the judiciary. 
 On the other hand, Cohen and Spitzer do not completely account 
for one phenomenon that would make a finding of government liti-
gant advantage more meaningful. The finding of an advantage to-
wards the government should be unsurprising,25 but their study does 
not establish whether the advantage exists as a government (execu-
tive branch) advantage as opposed to litigator (Solicitor General) ad-
vantage. Even if the advantage their data supports can truly be de-
scribed as a government litigant advantage, this alone does not make 
the case for modifying the advantage by statute or other reforms. By 
facilitating coordination of the unitary executive, a government liti-
gant advantage may promote, rather than undermine, rule-of-law 
values. 
 An advantage in favor of the Solicitor General in appellate litiga-
tion is no surprise. The simple fact that the Solicitor General is a re-
peat player is likely to have some effect on his ability to influence the 
                                                                                                                  
 23. At least one other scholar urges that the Solicitor General be understood solely as 
an “executive officer playing a part in the adversarial process.” Michael W. McConnell, The 
Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General , 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1118 (1988). 
 24. Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 6, at 412. 
 25. In fact, the current Solicitor General acknowledges these advantages. “[A]s Solici-
tor General, I must—and I do—proceed with the conviction that the positions we take be-
fore the Court, and the way we take them, play a role in the Court’s decisionmaking.” Seth 
P. Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75 IND. L.J. 
1297, 1298 (2000). 
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Supreme Court. Given his experience, the Solicitor General may be a 
more astute appellate litigator than other private litigants before the 
Supreme Court.26 Despite any asymmetry in experience and skill be-
tween the Solicitor General and private litigants, the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s repeat-player status makes him less likely to take positions 
that are not likely to be convincing with the Court. 27 Given the Solici-
tor General’s familiarity and reputation with the Court, the Solicitor 
General’s positions may carry more weight with the Justices than the 
positions of private litigants. 28 Cohen and Spitzer are aware of this 
and adjust their findings for a “deference” variable, accounting for 
the Court’s deference to government positions.29 Beyond this vari-
able, however, Cohen and Spitzer do not appear to account for the 
repetitive litigation of the Solicitor General in their model. What por-
tion of government litigant advantage is attributable to repetitive 
litigation, superior litigation strategy (because of the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s higher level of experience), and reputation effects; and what 
portion of the advantage can be attributed to the fact that this is the 
government? In other words, who has the advantage: the lawyer (the 
Solicitor General) or the client (the executive branch)?30 The defer-
ence variable used by Cohen and Spitzer explains some of the advan-
tage, but further study comparing the advantages of other repeat 
litigants would be necessary to more accurately isolate any advan-
tage as being rooted in the government rather than its lawyers.31 
 The benefits to repeat executive branch participation, through a 
single litigation mechanism, must be acknowledged. Without the fil-
tering device of the Solicitor General, individual agencies would di-
                                                                                                                  
 26. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
 27. Cf. McConnell, supra note 23, at 1107 (noting that the Solicitor General’s “credi-
bility in other cases will suffer if a brief is less than fully accurate”); see also CAPLAN, supra 
note 15, at 19 (discussing the tradition of high-quality submissions from the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s office); REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 34 
(1992) (praising the Solicitor General’s office for the “accuracy and reliability of its briefs”). 
 28. See Eric Schnapper, Becket at the Bar: The Conflicting Obligations of the Solicitor 
General, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1187, 1224 (1988) (“The Solicitor General’s reputation with 
the Court for advancing only reasonable arguments gives his or her contentions a special 
credibility.”). 
 29. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 6, at 424. 
 30. Cf. Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experi-
enced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187 (1995) (focusing on the repeat-player 
phenomenon, this study nonetheless fails to account for the influence of the Solicitor Gen-
eral). 
 31. Other data, more directly addressing the repeat-player phenomenon before the 
Court, seem to accord with Cohen and Spitzer’s findings. One recent study finds that the 
Solicitor General’s amicus briefs are more likely to be cited and have more of an influence 
on the Court’s decisions than the briefs of other repeat-player amici such as the ACLU and 
the AFL-CIO. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Cu-
riae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 803 (2000) (“Among the three in-
stitutional litigants with experienced Supreme Court lawyers, the largest deviation from 
the benchmark success rates occurred in cases where the Solicitor General appeared as 
amicus.”). 
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rectly seek certiorari of opinions they wish to have reversed. With 
this, the loss of presidential coordination, especially over independ-
ent agencies, is obvious. Further, the executive branch may lose the 
ability to implement a unified policy agenda in its litigation strategy, 
a particular problem when multiple agency interpretations of a legal 
issue conflict. The Solicitor General serves to coordinate agency ap-
pellate concerns, mediating conflicting agency interpretations before 
they reach the Court. 32 If the Solicitor General did not perform this 
task, the Court would have to. In this sense, the Solicitor General 
may work to reduce the public costs associated with government liti-
gation. The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged this benefit of 
the Solicitor General, the statutory delegate of the Attorney General, 
as a singular office in which the government’s litigation process is 
consolidated.33 Although questions remain, especially in the inde-
pendent agency context,34 the Court has continued to reaffirm the 
benefits of consolidating litigation authority within the Solicitor 
General’s office.35 
 In the end, as Cohen and Spitzer acknowledge, the implications to 
be drawn from their findings depend on normative questions outside 
the realm of their methods of positive political and rational choice 
theory. Specifically, Cohen and Spitzer have not presented a norma-
tive argument that the Supreme Court should have a monopoly over 
the articulation of the rule of law. Popular culture and, to a fault, le-
gal education place an awful lot of emphasis on the Supreme Court’s 
role in defining what the law is. But as Justice Jackson famously re-
marked of the Supreme Court, “We are not final because we are in-
fallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”36 Cohen and 
Spitzer remind us that in many instances lower courts—not the Su-
preme Court—are final. Cohen and Spitzer’s findings also illustrate 
how the executive branch may influence the issues on which the Su-
preme Court speaks with finality. This observation, however, does 
not undermine the legitimacy of final—or even interim—decisions on 
statutory, regulatory, and constitutional issues by the executive 
branch of government. 
 Since, on most issues of administrative law, the federal govern-
ment has a strong institutional interest in the outcome of the Su-
                                                                                                                  
 32. See SALOKAR, supra note 27, at 78 (describing the Solicitor General as a “gate-
keeper—mediator, judge, broker, or ‘head basher’ when conflicts arise between agencies, 
departments, or divisions”). 
 33. See United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279 (1888). 
 34. See Devins, supra note 1, at 304-12. 
 35. See Federal Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994) 
(holding the Federal Election Commision lacked authority to petition for certiorari inde-
pendent of the Solicitor General even in actions brought under the statute the Federal 
Election Commision was created to administer). 
 36. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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preme Court’s decisions, it is legitimate for the Court to give the ex-
ecutive branch’s arguments some special weight, especially given the 
filtering role performed by the Solicitor General. The Solicitor Gen-
eral serves an important function in providing executive branch in-
put to the Court’s final resolution of issues in which the executive 
branch has a significant stake. The U.S. Constitution charges the 
President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”37 The 
“Laws” for which the President assumes enforcement responsibility 
certainly include statutes and regulations. Often, as in the recent to-
bacco regulation case,38 when the Court does weigh in on issues of 
administrative law, it determines whether the executive authority 
has been wrongly exercised. Such cases do not necessarily concern 
constitutional error but rather the legality of exercises of executive 
discretion under statutes and regulations. 39 By paying special defer-
ence to the executive branch, the Court may promote the values of 
the Administration, in providing expertise and political accountabil-
ity for the coordinated policies of executive agencies.  
 The nonacquiescence issue emphasized by Cohen and Spitzer is a 
potential problem if the executive branch continues to adhere to a 
position after several circuit court defeats or if it engages in “in-
tracircuit” nonacquiescence, adhering to a position in the same cir-
cuit that had previously adjudicated it illegal. The Supreme Court, 
however, has implicitly approved intracircuit nonacquiescence.40 Ul-
timately, courts may define the boundaries regarding what the law 
may require or allow. But as the judicial position is taking shape, it 
is entirely legitimate for the executive branch to insist on its own 
reading of the law. Indeed, if the executive branch does not make ef-
forts to actively promote its own reading of the law, the expertise and 
political accountability values of the Chevron approach to statutory 
interpretation will be lost. 
 One of the issues not included in Cohen and Spitzer’s analysis 
goes beyond the executive branch’s concerns with the federal gov-
ernment’s institutional interests. The Solicitor General often advo-
cates the Administration’s view on constitutional issues where the 
federal government has a direct institutional stake.41 Less fre-
                                                                                                                  
 37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 38. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). 
 39. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. (Columbia Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 013, forthcoming 
2000) (highlighting how the Supreme Court has become less interested in allowing federal 
courts to adjudicate these types of questions in recent years, refusing to hear cases on 
grounds such as unreviewability and lack of standing), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
paper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID=204231 (last visited Oct. 14, 2000). 
 40. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161 (1984) (rejecting the application 
of nonmutual collateral estoppel to government litigants). 
 41. See Strauss, supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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quently, the Solicitor General may weigh in as an amicus on consti-
tutional issues over which the federal government has no immediate 
institutional stake. For instance, since there are no federal laws 
banning abortion, the Solicitor General’s participation as an amicus 
in abortion cases involving state law is little more than an effort by 
the executive branch to influence the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
positions. Is such participation inappropriate? This too depends on 
questions that are beyond the scope of positive political theory, such 
as whether the politics of presidential elections are relevant to con-
stitutional interpretation. The Solicitor General was much maligned 
during the Reagan years, but history reveals a long tradition of So-
licitor General involvement as an amicus in high-profile constitu-
tional matters for political reasons, including Brown v. Board of 
Education,42 the reapportionment cases, 43 and the abortion cases. 44 
There are obvious costs to the Solicitor General in advocating every 
political viewpoint endorsed by the Administration. Yet, not all con-
stitutional scholars would deem the President’s views on constitu-
tional issues irrelevant to the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking 
agenda and its outcomes, even where the issues are purely issues of 
presidential viewpoint regarding constitutional interpretation.45 Ar-
                                                                                                                  
 42. 347 U.S. 483, 485 (1954). Note, however, that Brown does not include the Solicitor 
General as the filing party. See Philip Elman, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frank-
furter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 
826-27 (1987) (noting that Philip Elman of the Solicitor General’s office was significantly 
involved in the writing of the United States’ amicus brief in Brown, but a newly appointed 
Solicitor General who was not involved in the brief’s production did not sign the brief). 
 43. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). During the reapportionment cases, Solicitor Gen-
eral Archibald Cox urged the Court to reconsider precedents permitting malapportioned 
legislatures. See CAPLAN, supra note 15, at 190-94. 
 44. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appe l-
lants, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 
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Thornburgh arguing to overrule Roe v. Wade). 
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guably, the “Laws” for which the President assumes enforcement au-
thority include the Constitution itself. 
 V.   CONCLUSION 
 Treating the government as any other private litigant may allow 
us to identify and isolate behaviors, but unless understood within a 
normative understanding of the government’s role, such treatment 
also risks misinterpretation of a study’s results. When the govern-
ment wins before the Supreme Court, we might characterize this as 
an “advantage” for one litigant, as do Cohen and Spitzer. At the same 
time, the government’s victory must be assessed in the context of the 
issues it has raised. A government win might well indicate an “ad-
vantage,” but it might also evidence that the public has emerged vic-
torious over private interests. 
 The degree of weight the Court should afford to the executive 
branch on issues of regulatory, statutory, and constitutional law is a 
complex normative question about which Cohen and Spitzer’s 
method, positive political theory, has almost nothing to say. As a de-
scriptive and explanatory—but not a normative—method, positive 
political theory sheds little light on whether the executive branch 
should have more of a voice than private litigants or Congress in the 
Supreme Court’s consideration of the rule of law. The theory of the 
unitary executive provides some normative justification for govern-
ment litigant advantage, as Cohen and Spitzer describe in the con-
text of the Solicitor General. By coordinating and bolstering the poli-
cies of the executive branch, a government advantage may promote, 
rather than undermine, the rule-of-law values of a constitutional 
democracy. 
